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Abstract
I build a simple model of self-selection into migration and immi-
gration policy determination. I rst show how immigration restrictions
a¤ect not only the size but also the skill composition of the migration
ow. I then explore how the optimal policy may change once this e¤ect
on immigrantsskill composition is considered. I show that the rela-
tion between immigrants skill composition and immigration policies
is governed by immigrants self-selection, hence understanding what
drives such selection becomes crucial for designing optimal immigra-
tion policies.
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1 Introduction
Migrants are not a random sample of their home country population. Incen-
tives to migrate, and resources to pay the migration costs, vary with skills.
This paper builds on this well-known fact in order to explore the interac-
tion between self-selection into migration and the determination of immigra-
tion policy in receiving countries. In fact, while it is commonly understood
that various e¤ects of migration vary signicantly with immigrants char-
acteristics,1 the relation between immigration policy and immigrantsskill
composition remains largely unexplored.
In what follows, I rst show how immigration policy a¤ects not only
the size but also the skill composition of the migration ow. I then explore
how the optimal policy may change once this e¤ect on immigrants skill
composition is taken into account. As it turns out, predicting the relation
between immigrantsskill composition and immigration policy may be cru-
cial for predicting the outcome of such policy in the receiving country. This
in turns requires understanding the forces behind immigrantsself-selection,
which determine how di¤erent potential migrants respond to policy changes.
The above argument is developed in a model with two countries. In the
sending country, individuals, called foreigners, are endowed with di¤erent
skills and wealth, and according to their endowment they decide whether to
work at home or migrate to the receiving country. In the receiving country,
individuals, called natives, support an immigration policy that maximizes
their equilibrium wages. In particular, high skilled natives aim at increasing
the supply of low skilled immigrants, while low skilled natives push for the
opposite. According to these preferences and to the weight attached to dif-
ferent groups in the population, i.e. low vs. high skilled and immigrants vs.
natives, the receiving country government sets the immigration restrictions.
In particular, these restrictions may a¤ect the cost migrants have to pay to
enter and work in the receiving country. For example, the government may
impose direct fees or bureaucratic requirements that increase the time and
money needed to comply.
Even if common to all immigrants, these restrictions a¤ect immigrants
in a di¤erent way. On the one hand, they allow only the richest foreigners
to migrate, and these tend to be the high skilled. On the other, they induce
only those with the most to gain to migrate. If returns to skills are higher
in the sending country, these tend to be the low skilled. Hence, depending
on whether immigration is driven by incentives or wealth constraints, and
on whether returns to skills are higher in the sending or in the destination
country, restrictions may improve or worsen immigrantsskill composition.
1Restricting the attention to the economics literature, see Borjas (1994), Friedberg and
Hunt (1995), Chiswick, Lee and Miller (2005) on the labor market e¤ects, and Storesletten
(2000), Lee and Miller (2000), Chojnicki, Docquier and Ragot (2005) on the e¤ects on
public nance.
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Understanding this composition e¤ect is crucial for the receiving coun-
try because such e¤ect may reverse the immigration policy outcomes, as
predicted by the size e¤ect only. In fact, size and composition e¤ects have
typically opposite directions. The size e¤ect, whereby one varies the number
of immigrants while keeping their skill composition as xed, is by denition
random, and so it hits a group of foreigners proportionally to their propen-
sity to migrate. In contrast, the composition e¤ect tends to be stronger on
those who migrate less.
Moreover, the composition e¤ect may dominate the size e¤ect: the for-
eigners with the lowest propensity to migrate may be, in absolute terms,
the most sensitive to a policy change. Finally, the strength of size and com-
position e¤ects depends on the level of restrictions. In particular, when the
migration cost is so high that only one group of foreigners migrates, being
they the richest or the most motivated, then by denition there is no compo-
sition e¤ect. As a result, immigration restrictions may have a non-monotone
e¤ect on the receiving country.
It follows that it is generally misleading to view immigration restrictions
as just selecting from a given pool of applicants, thereby acting indepen-
dently from the migration decision. As an illustration, we highlight how
the composition e¤ect may a¤ect nativespreferences over immigration pol-
icy and the governments optimal policy design. First, such e¤ect implies
that nativespreferences over immigration policy depend not only on im-
migrants skill composition but also on their self-selection. For example,
some natives may support a more restrictive policy even though current im-
migrants are not harmful for them, since tighter restrictions would change
immigrantsskill composition in their favor. Second, the composition e¤ect
implies that even a utilitarian government which maximizes nativestotal
income may choose positive immigration restrictions. In fact, while free
immigration would always be optimal if immigrantsskill composition were
taken as given, in our setting restrictions may be imposed in order to select
the optimal skill mix of immigrants.
1.1 Related literature
The present paper lies within two streams of literature: the supply side
of immigration, dealing with the migration decision and immigrants self-
selection; and the demand side, dealing with citizenspreferences over im-
migration and immigration policy formation. At a general level, the major
novelty of the paper is the focus on the interaction between demand and
supply, in order to show that, by considering each side in isolation, one
may draw erroneous conclusions both on self-selection and on the e¤ects of
immigration policy in the receiving country.2
2The only paper considering this interaction is, to my knowledge, Bellettini and Ceroni
(2007). Assuming that immigrants are positively self-selected, they argue in favor of a
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More specically, the migration decision is here viewed as a basic human
capital investment (Sjaastad, 1962), in which self-selection may be driven
both by cross-countries returns to skills (as in Borjas, 1987) and by wealth
constraints.3 In addition, I emphasize that immigration policies may be a
signicant determinant of immigration costs, and then of immigrantsskill
composition.4 This allows to explore in a simple way the interaction between
demand and supply and to better match some recent empirical literature (see
Section 3.3.2).
On the demand side, individual skills are related to preferences over
immigration policy by a standard labor market interaction.5 Di¤erently
from the existing literature, in which immigrantsskill composition is taken
as given, I model individual preferences whereby natives realize that such
composition is a¤ected by immigration restrictions.
Finally, the present paper contributes to the relatively small literature on
the determination of immigration policies.6 Apart for stressing the interac-
tion with the supply side, our approach is novel in that we consider migration
cost as the policy variable. This variable seems important as any restriction
to immigration entails, at least indirectly, monetary costs. Indeed, as we
discuss in Section 4.1, this framework may be interpreted in more general
terms. Moreover, the exercise appears useful even if one considers our pol-
icy variable literally as a tax on immigrants. Such tax has recently received
attention in policy debates (see Freeman, 2006 and Legrain, 2007), but to
high immigration quota. By reducing wages in the receiving country, this would increase
immigrant quality and maximize national income.
3Wealth constraints have been relatively underemphasized in this literature, as pointed
out by Hatton and Williamson (2004). Exceptions are the theory of illegal migration in
Friebel and Guriev (2006) and the work by Lopez and Schi¤ (1998), who focus on the
e¤ect of trade liberalization in the sending country in a modied Hecksher-Ohlin model
with heterogeneous labor force, migration costs and nancing constraints.
4Of course, migration costs have also exogenous components, like geography. However,
notice that policies may become increasingly relevant, given the historical trend of decreas-
ing transportation costs and increasing immigration restrictions (Hatton and Williamson,
2006). Indeed, the fact that migration costs can partly be a policy variable is recognized
also in Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002), who assume that lower quotas indirectly
imply higher costs for migrants. However their analysis, similarly to Mayda (2005), is
focused on the volume of immigration ows and does not address the relation between
policy and skills composition of immigrants.
5This approach is taken for example in Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2006).
They document that, in developed countries, where immigrants tend to be less skilled than
natives, individual education and support for liberal immigration policy are positively
correlated. The typical interpretation is in terms of labor market interaction, which is
supported by the fact that the correlation disappears once one looks at people outside the
labor force.
6See for example Benhabib (1996), who explores how the median voter determines
minimal capital requirements for admission, and Epstein and Nitzan (2006) and Facchini
and Willman (2005), who use a lobbying model to explain the formation of immigration
quotas.
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my knowledge its e¤ects have not been explored in a formal model.7
2 The model
Consider a world with two countries, a sending and a receiving one. We
are interested in the interaction between the workers in the sending country,
who may decide to migrate, and the receiving country government, which
sets the immigration policy.
2.1 The sending country
The sending country is populated by a continuum n of workers, called
foreigners. Foreigners are heterogeneous in three respects: skill, migration
cost, and initial wealth. Let n denote the mass of foreigners with skill ,
where  2 fH;Lg: A foreigner i with skill  may migrate to the receiving
country, and receive the endogenous wage w, or he can work in the sending
country for an exogenous wage w :
8
If he migrates, such foreigner has to incur the migration cost ( + "i);
which includes a common monetary cost  and an individual-specic psycho-
logical cost "i.9 Specically, "i is assumed to be a random variable following
a log-concave cumulative distribution  with continuous density .10 This
assumption implies that the ratio


is decreasing. (1)
Finally, foreigners are endowed with some wealth, drawn by a distribution

 with continuous density !: For now, we interpret  as an observable skill
(like education), and we then assume that the high skilled are on average
7One may also be interested on such policy from an historical viewpoint, since the rst
interventions to limit and select immigration ows in the U.S. and Canada acted on costs
rather than on quantities. In the U.S., for example, a head tax of 50 cents per migrant
was introduced in 1882, while the rst quota restriction came in 1921 (see Timmer and
Williamson, 1998 for a detailed account).
8While wages in origin countries may be a¤ected by emigration (see Mishra, 2007 and
Hanson, 2005), we here focus on the e¤ects in the receiving country.
9This cost may reect individual characteristics like age, family ties, access to networks
at origin and destination countries. In the present formulation, these elements are not
systematically correlated with the skill : One may instead assume that the low-skilled
have higher migration costs, since for example they can hardly give up the support of
their community, in terms of access to credit (as in Banerjee and Newman, 1998 and
Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2005) or unemployment insurance (as in Cuecuecha, 2005). This
would be qualitatively similar to our analysis below, in which wealth constraints make the
migration cost more di¢ cult to pay for the low-skilled.
10Formally, log-concavity means that those at the tails of the distribution of cost are not
too sensitive to a change in the returns of migration. This is a rather weak assumption, as
basically all "named" distribution functions satisfy it (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).
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wealthier than the low skilled (see Filmer and Pritchett, 1999; and Piketty,
2000).11 Formally, we assume that, for every  2 R+;
!L
1  
L 
!H
1  
H : (2)
That is, the high skilled wealth distribution is more favorable than the low
skilled one, in the sense of conditional stochastic dominance.12 We also
assume that migrants have to incur the cost  up-front, and there is no credit
market for them. Hence, migration may be limited by wealth constraints.
2.2 The receiving country
The receiving country is populated by a continuum n of workers, here called
natives, who are heterogeneous in skill  2 fH;Lg: Natives are assumed to
have a linear utility function which depends only on equilibrium wages w:13
These wages are determined in a competitive labor market as
w =
@F (NH ; NL)
@N
; (3)
where F (NH ; NL) is the receiving country production function and N is
the sum of natives and immigrants with skill 
N = n + x: (4)
We focus on purely redistributive e¤ects of immigration, whereby immi-
grants compete with similarly skilled natives and complement natives with
di¤erent skills. In particular, for most of the analysis, we simply let the
production technology be a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
F (NH ; NL) = N

HN
1 
L ; (5)
where  2 (0; 1): The receiving country government is interested in regulat-
ing the inows of immigrants as these inuence nativesutility. Its goal is
to maximize the welfare function
W = HwH + LwL;
where  denotes the weight attached to group s utility, as determined by
the specic institutional setting.14 Immigration policy acts on ; which is
11As it will be noticed below, this framework can be also applied to analyze selection
along unobservable characteristics.
12This is slightly stronger than rst order stochastic dominance, but weaker than the
standard assumption of monotone likelihood ratio (see Krishna, 2002, Appendix B).
13 In Section 4.3, we discuss more general formulations.
14We will mostly consider a utilitarian function with  = n: Some extensions and
possible ways to endogenize these weights are discussed in Section 4.2.
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the cost foreigners have to incur to enter and work in the receiving country15,
so the governments program can be written as
max
2R+
HwH() + LwL(): (6)
3 Analysis
We now show that, in order to set the optimal policy, the receiving country
government has to predict the e¤ects of such policy on immigrants skill
composition. This in turn requires an understanding of the forces driving
the decision to migrate, i.e. of immigrantsself-selection.
3.1 The migration decision
A foreigner i with skill  prefers to migrate if w  (+ "i)  w ; so for each
skill  there exists a cut-o¤ value "  w  w    such that any individual
with skill  and a cost "i lower than " would like to migrate. In addition,
this individual must be su¢ ciently wealthy to incur the migration cost :
Thus, the supply of migrants with skill  is dened by
x = qn

; (7)
where q is the fraction of foreigners with skill  who can a¤ord and who
are willing to move, i.e.
q = [1  
()][w   w   ]: (8)
We dene immigrantsskill composition as the ratio of high to low skilled
migrants, i.e.
Q =
qH
qL
; (9)
and we say that immigrants are positively self-selected if and only if Q  1:
3.2 Optimal immigration restrictions
According to equations (3) and (5), equilibrium wages in the receiving coun-
try can be written as
wH = R
 1; (10)
and
wL = (1  )R; (11)
15As discussed in Section 4.1, this cost need not be though only as an entry tax, and as
such, we do not include its potential revenues in the welfare function. In fact, a signicant
part of migration costs depends on immigration restrictions, but it is not pocketed by the
receiving country government (e.g. immigrantsexpenses for legal and consulting services
needed to comply with bureaucracies).
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where R is the ratio of high to low skilled workers
R =
NH
NL
=
nH + xH
nL + xL
: (12)
Hence, the receiving country skill distribution and equilibrium wages depend
on migration ows, and then on the immigration policy .16 We can write
the governments program in equation (6) as
max
2R+
HR
 1 + L(1  )R: (13)
Obviously, the optimal policy depends on the weights . The higher is H ,
the lower R will be induced by such policy.
For now, we abstract from redistributive concerns or other political econ-
omy distortions, and consider a purely utilitarian setting in which each group
is valued according to its size. Notice rst that, in this setting, no immi-
gration restrictions are imposed if immigrants are given the same weight as
natives. In fact, if
 = N;
then the welfare function W does not depend on R; i.e. on high vs. low
skilled wages, but only on total production. Hence, W would be maximized
by setting  = 0.
A preference for high or for low skilled workers instead arises when immi-
grants receive a lower weight than natives. In this case, the government sets
its policy in order to benet the group of workers in which the proportion
of immigrants is lower. Suppose the government cares only about natives,
then
 = n;
and we have that
dW
d
= (1  )wH [nLxH   nHxL
nH + xH
]
dR
d
: (14)
In this case, the welfare function W is convex in R and it has a minimum at
R = nH=nL: E¢ ciency gains from immigration are minimized when immi-
grants have the same skill composition as the native population, i.e. when
xH=xL = nH=nL.17 Since the government maximizes e¢ ciency, i.e. natives
total income, it aims at optimizing the skill ratio R. In particular, if immi-
grants are less skilled than natives, the optimal policy is the one preferred by
high skilled natives, which is the one minimizing the ratio R; and vice-versa
if immigrants are more skilled than natives.
16Notice that wH ; wL and R are uniquely dened by equations (10), (11) and (12). In
fact, the right hand sides of equations (10), (11) and (12) are continuous are decreasing
in wH ; wL and R; respectively. Hence, the xed point problems in such equations have
always a unique solution.
17The result resembles a well known principle in international trade, where gains from
trade are higher the greater the trading countries di¤er in their factor endowments. A
similar point, in a more complicated setting, is made by Borjas (1995).
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3.2.1 Size and composition e¤ects
As expressed in equation (14), the governments program needs to account
for how immigration policy a¤ects the skill ratio R: As we now show, this
in turn requires an understanding of the forces driving the migration ows.
Notice rst that, di¤erentiating equation (12) and rearranging terms, we
have that
dR
d

NL
2   @xH
@wH
@wH
@R
NL +
@xL
@wL
@wL
@R
NH

=
@xH
@
NL   @xL
@
NH :
Since @wH=@R < 0 and @wL=@R > 0; the term in parentheses is positive,
so the ratio R increases in  if and only if
@xH
@
NL  @xL
@
NH : (15)
Notice that @x=@ are partial derivatives, i.e. they describe the direct e¤ect
of immigration policy on immigration ows, abstracting from the e¤ect on
equilibrium wages.
In order to highlight the role of self-selection, one can multiply both sides
of equation (15) by xLxH and see that the ratio R increases in  if and only
if
xH
nH + xH
 @xH
@
xL  xL
nL + xL
 @xL
@
xH : (16)
Equation (16) can be decomposed as the product of two forces:
xH
nH + xH
 xL
nL + xL
;
which is equivalent to
xH
xL
 nH
nL
; (17)
and
@xH
@
xL  @xL
@
xH ;
which is equivalent to
@Q
@
 0: (18)
Equation (17) describes a size e¤ect, i.e. what happens to the skill ratio R
when one varies the number of immigrants, while keeping their skill compo-
sition as xed. If immigration restrictions had no other e¤ect, then welfare
would be maximized with free immigration. In fact, equation (17) tells that
increasing the cost increases the ratio R if and only if immigrants are less
skilled than natives. According to equation (14), we would then have
dW
d
 0:
We summarize this result in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 1 If immigrantsskill composition was taken as given, a util-
itarian government would impose no immigration restrictions.
However, as described by equation (18), any immigration policy also
changes the average skill of immigrants. This represents a composition ef-
fect : higher restrictions increase the skill ratio R if and only if they increase
immigrantsskill composition Q. Before turning to the rest of our analy-
sis, in which we investigate what drives such composition e¤ect and which
are its implications for the optimal policy design, we state the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2 The e¤ect of immigration policy on the receiving country
skill ratio can be decomposed in an e¤ect on the size and an e¤ect on the
composition of the migration ow, described respectively by equations (17)
and (18).
3.3 The composition e¤ect
Standard discussions about immigration policies abstract from the compo-
sition e¤ect. However, such abstraction may be misleading, since this e¤ect
may sometimes reverse the predictions based on the size e¤ect only. As we
now show, there are situations in which the tension between the two e¤ects
is inescapable, i.e.
@Q
@
 0 if and only if xH
xL
 nH
nL
; (19)
and, in addition, the composition e¤ect may be stronger. To show this, we
rst rewrite condition (15) as
@qH
@
nHnL  
@qL
@
nLnH +
@qH
@
qLn

Hn

L  
@qL
@
qHn

Ln

H  0: (20)
From the last equation, we see that the composition e¤ect is less likely to
be an issue if the skill compositions of the two countries are very di¤erent.
Suppose for example that the sending country has a very poor skill composi-
tion, i.e. nHnL is much lower than n

LnH . All else equals, a more restrictive
policy is likely to have a larger impact on low skilled foreigners, thereby
increasing the ratio R.
This e¤ect being clear, we now concentrate on selection issues, and so
consider the case in which the skill composition between the sending and
the receiving country is similar. In particular, we let
nH = nH and n

L = nL; (21)
and so we write condition (20) as
@qH
@
  @qL
@
+
@qH
@
qL   @qL
@
qH  0: (22)
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The last equation emphasizes that the relation between R and  depends
on how the policy a¤ects the propensity to migrate of low and high skilled
foreigners. Predicting such relation then requires an understanding of the
forces behind immigrantsself-selection, as we now consider.
3.3.1 The simplest case: no wealth constraints
To illustrate our argument in the cleanest way, we rst abstract from wealth
constraints. Besides being simple, this way of modeling the migration de-
cision emphasizes cross-countries wage di¤erentials, as in the classic self-
selection literature.18 In this case, immigrantsself-selection is driven only
by the incentives that foreigners face according to their skills, and immi-
grantsskill composition in equation (9) writes simply as
Q =
(wH   wH   )
(wL   wL   )
: (23)
Therefore, immigrants are positively self-selected if and only if absolute gains
from migration increase with skills, i.e. if (wH   wH)  (wL   wL): Alter-
natively, this condition can be rearranged in terms of wage di¤erentials in
the sending vs. receiving country, dened respectively as w = wH   wL
and w = wH   wL; as
w  w: (24)
Accordingly, when condition (24) holds, we say that returns to skills are
higher in the receiving country.
Wage di¤erentials drive also the relation between Q and immigration
restrictions. In fact, simply di¤erentiating (23), we have
@Q
@
 0() ("L)("H)  ("H)("L)  0() w  w: (25)
Equation (25) describes an incentive e¤ect. As expressed in condition (1),
changing costs has a relatively higher impact on the foreigners with lower
gains from migration. These foreigners tend to be low skilled, and so re-
strictions and skill composition are positively related, if and only if wage
dispersion is higher in the receiving country.
To see how this e¤ect matters for the receiving country, we simplify
further our analysis by assuming that the psychological cost of migration is
uniformly distributed over some interval [a; b]: Hence, for " 2 [a; b]; ("L) =
("H) and, substituting into equation (22), we see that
@R
@
 0() ("H) ("L)  0() w  w: (26)
18This may also be the most natural setting to consider if one is interested in selection
along non-observable dimensions, which need not be systematically correlated with wealth.
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From equation (26), restrictions increase R if and only if immigrants are
more skilled than natives. Hence, as long as both thresholds "L and "H lie
within the interval [a; b]; the composition e¤ect prevails. When instead one
of the thresholds "L and "H lies outside the interval [a; b], the sign of the
derivative is reversed, i.e. the size e¤ect prevails.
It follows that the composition e¤ect may prevail only when restrictions
are not too high, so that both groups of natives have incentive to migrate.
To see this, suppose for example that the low skilled have always higher gains
from migration (i.e. w  w for all ) and that, at the current level of
restrictions, some high skilled is still willing to migrate (i.e. wH  wH   a >
). According to equation (26), a marginal increase in the cost decreases
R despite that immigrants are less skilled than natives. This is due to the
composition e¤ect, i.e. to the fact that an higher cost induces an even lower
immigrantsskill composition. At some point, however, the cost becomes so
high that no high skilled has incentive to move, so the composition e¤ect
disappears. Such cost is implicitly dened by
 = wH()  wH   a:
Beyond ; increasing the cost just decreases the number of immigrants,
without a¤ecting their composition. Since immigrants are low skilled, this
increases the skill ratio R: In sum, in this example, the composition e¤ect
is stronger for   ; while the size e¤ect dominates afterwards, and the
relation between R and  is U-shaped, with a minimum at  = .19
Even in such simple setting, we gain some fundamental insights on the
relation between size and composition e¤ects. First, the composition e¤ect
pushes the skill ratio into the opposite direction than the standard size e¤ect.
By equations (23) and (25), further restrictions improve immigrants skill
composition if and only if immigrants are more skilled than natives, which is
the tension dened in condition (19). The reason is intuitive: the size e¤ect
is by denition random, so it hits a group of foreigners proportionally to their
propensity to migrate, while the composition e¤ect tends to be stronger on
the least represented group.
Second, the relation between the skill ratio and immigration restrictions
may be non-monotonic.20 In particular, the composition e¤ect may domi-
nate the size e¤ect at low levels of restrictions. We summarize these ndings
with the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 When migration is driven only by incentives,
19Such  always exists. In fact, even if in this example wH rst increases in ; wH is
bounded so  > wH   wH   a for  su¢ ciently large.
20This has been shown using the convenient special case of a uniformly distributed cost
"i. As it is clear from equation (22), however, this is the case whenever the ratio =(1+)
is decreasing.
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a) Immigrants are positively self-selected if and only if w  w;
b) Immigration restrictions increase Q if and only if w  w;
c) Under condition (21), size and composition e¤ects have the opposite di-
rection;
d) The relation between R and  may be non-monotonic, with the compo-
sition e¤ect being stronger for low levels of restrictions.
The fact that the composition e¤ect may reverse the policy outcome, as
predicted by the size e¤ect only, has a number of counter-intuitive impli-
cations. First, some natives may support further immigration restrictions
even if immigrants are not harmful for them. Suppose for example that
w  w; so immigrants are positively self-selected and they improve the
receiving country skill ratio. In this case, low skilled natives may push for
an higher  even if immigration increase their wage, since restrictions would
further improve immigrantsskill composition and the receiving country skill
ratio. Hence, individual preferences over immigration policy should consider
immigrantsself-selection in addition to their skill composition.
Second, in this setting, even a utilitarian government may impose pos-
itive immigration restrictions. In fact, as discussed after equation (14), a
government with weights  = n aims at maximizing or minimizing the
skill ratio. If the relation between R and  is non-monotonic, however, this
requires setting a positive  (in the example above, it would be  = ):
Restrictions here are not due to distributional concerns, or other departures
from pure e¢ ciency, but they are a way to screen immigrants by a¤ect-
ing their self-selection. We summarize these observations in the following
Corollaries.
Corollary 1 When the composition e¤ect prevails, some natives may sup-
port further restrictions even if immigrants are not harmful for them.
Corollary 2 Immigration restrictions may be optimal even for a utilitarian
government that cares only about nativestotal income.
3.3.2 The general case: incentive and wealth e¤ects
We now explore how the previous insights carry through in a setting where
potential migrants face wealth constraints, and so self-selection is driven
also by di¤erent abilities to incur the migration cost. For our purposes,
this implies that it may not be su¢ cient to know whether immigrants are
positively or negatively self-selected, but one needs to know also what drives
self-selection. Those with the highest gain from migration, and then the
highest willingness to pay for it, are not necessarily the ones with the highest
resources to pay for it.
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Besides being a more general formulation of the migration decision, this
setting matches better with the empirical evidence. As implied by equation
(2), wealth constraints are less severe for the high skilled. Hence, we have
that
[1  
H()]  [1  
L()];
which pushes towards positive self-selection in terms of observables. As a
result, immigrants may be positively self-selected even if returns to skills
are higher in the source country and physical costs of migration are rela-
tively small, as in the case of Mexican immigrants to the U.S. considered in
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005).
In this setting, we rst notice that increasing immigration restrictions
improves immigrant skill composition Q when
("L)("H)  ("H)("L)
("H)("L)
+
!L(1  
H)  !H(1  
L)
(1  
H)(1  
L)  0: (27)
The rst term is the same incentive e¤ect described in the previous Section.
The second term represents a wealth e¤ect. By equation (2), this is always
positive: by increasing the cost, one gets richer and more skilled migrants.
It is then clear that when only wealth constraints matter, or when w 
w; migrants skill composition increases with migration costs. If instead
w < w; the e¤ect is ambiguous. As  ! 0; the relation tends to
be negative, since the wealth e¤ect is weak and incentives dominate. The
shape of Q as the cost increases depends on the strength of the two e¤ects.
Roughly, when ("H) goes to zero faster than (1  
L), Q tends to zero as
 increases, since at some point a few high skilled are willing to migrate.
When the opposite occurs, there exists a cost beyond which the wealth e¤ect
takes over, so the relation is U-shaped.
Turning to the e¤ect of  on the skill ratio R, we rst notice that in this
setting size and composition e¤ects need not go in opposite directions. In
fact, increasing restriction may decrease the size of low skilled immigration
and at the same time improve immigrantsself-selection by reinforcing the
wealth e¤ect.21 However, we concentrate in the more interesting case in
which size and composition e¤ects have opposite directions. This occurs
whenever the relation between Q and  is monotone, i.e. either w  w
or self-selection is driven only by wealth constraints or only by incentives,
and the reason is the same as in the previous analysis.
In such cases, given equation (21), a su¢ cient condition for the compo-
sition e¤ect to prevail is that the foreigners with the lowest propensity to
21Say for example that  is very low and that w < w, so immigrants are negatively
self-selected and they decrease R. By the size e¤ect, increasing restrictions increases R.
Moreover, further restrictions may also improve immigrantsskill composition as higher
costs make wealth constraints more binding, which in turn induces a further increase in
R.
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migrate are, in absolute terms, the most sensitive to a policy change, that
is
xH  xL if and only if @qH
@
 @qL
@
: (28)
In fact, when the relation between Q and  is monotone, condition (27)
holds if and only if xH  xL. That is qL(@qH=@)  qH(@qL=@) if and
only if xH  xL. Together with condition (28), this implies condition (22),
that is R increases with  despite that immigrants are more skilled than
natives.22 Moreover, as it can be noticed by equation (22), if qL and qH are
small, condition (28) is almost necessary.
Moreover, similarly to the previous analysis, the composition e¤ect may
prevail only when the cost is su¢ ciently small, so that the population of
migrants is su¢ ciently heterogeneous. If the cost is so high that only one
group of foreigners migrates, being they the richest or the most motivated,
then by denition there is no composition e¤ect.23 It follows that the rela-
tion between R and  need not be monotone. As discussed at the end of the
previous Section, this implies that natives may support a more restrictive
policy despite current immigrants are benecial for them; and that a util-
itarian government may optimally impose positive immigration costs. We
summarize this analysis in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 When migration is driven both by incentives and by wealth
constraints,
a) Immigrants are positively self-selected if w  w or wealth constraints
dominate;
b) Immigration restrictions increase Q if w  w or the wealth e¤ect
dominates;
c) Size and composition e¤ects may have the opposite direction;
d) The relation between R and  may be non-monotonic, with the compo-
sition e¤ect being stronger for low levels of restrictions;
e) Corollaries 1 and 2 still hold.
4 Discussion and extensions
In this Section, we discuss how our main assumptions a¤ect the above analy-
sis and propose some extensions of our framework.
22For example, this may occur when immigrants are mostly low skilled and illegal.
Immigrants depress R but immigration restrictions are likely to worsen the situation by
discouraging high skilled migrants, without a¤ecting low skilled (illegal) ones.
23Similarly to the previous analysis, the maximum cost depends on the functional forms
 and 
 one assumes (see Bianchi, 2006, for some examples).
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4.1 Immigration policy
Taken literally, our model makes some important simplications on the im-
migration policy space. We assume that restrictions only a¤ect the migra-
tion cost, and that they act unconditionally on skills. We now see how our
analysis would change by relaxing these assumptions.
First, immigration restrictions include several dimensions beside the
monetary cost ; so our framework may be a starting point to complicate the
policy space. For example, immigration is typically restricted via quotas. In
our setting, however, changing the quota a¤ects immigrantsself-selection
in a similar way than changing the cost . In fact, the quota a¤ects the
probability that, upon submitting a demand, a foreigner receives an entry
visa. Suppose that submitting such demand entails a cost (either monetary
or in terms of time). A foreigner applies for a visa only if the expected
benets, i.e. the wage di¤erential multiplied by the probability of getting
the visa, exceeds the cost. Changing the quota then has a stronger impact
on those with lower gains from migration, which is the same incentive e¤ect
we described in the above analysis.
In addition, immigration typically requires spending a signicant amount
of time in order to comply with bureaucracies. Since the value of time
may di¤er according to skills, bureaucracies may also a¤ect self-selection.
As a simple example, assume that each migrant has to invest some xed
amount of time  in bureaucracies, and this time is worth w : Since in
this case bureaucracies are more harmful for the high skilled, the conditions
for positive self-selection become harder to satisfy. When only incentives
matter, we need that w > (1 + )w; i.e. di¤erential returns to skill in
the receiving country are su¢ ciently high to compensate also for the higher
waste of time. Hence, with respect to the case of no bureaucracies, increasing
restrictions (i.e. both  and ) is now more likely to reduce immigrantsskill
composition.
Finally, countries may try to impose di¤erent restrictions on di¤erent
types of immigrants. Obviously, if the receiving country could perfectly
contract on immigrant skills, it would directly select the desired size and
type of immigration, and the interaction between policy and skill composi-
tion would be trivial. Still, there are reasons which suggest that our exercise
may still be useful. First, many aspects of immigration policies, like bureau-
cracies, tend to be independent on skills. In this respect, we emphasize that
even such policies have screening power. Second, while countries like Aus-
tralia and Canada have implemented systems to directly screen immigrants
according to their skills, several authors have stressed that such systems have
very little ability to a¤ect immigrantsskills and long-term success in the
receiving country (see e.g. Miller, 1999 on Australia; Antecol, Cobb-Clark
and Trejo, 2003 and Jasso and Rosenzweig, 2008 on Canada and Australia
vs. the U.S.). Third, immigrantsself-selection operates also along unob-
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servable dimensions, which may a¤ect immigrantsassimilation and so be
of interest for receiving countries. These dimensions are by denition not
contractible and hence they can be a¤ected only through indirect screening
mechanisms.
4.2 Governments preferences
Our analysis has concentrated on the case of a utilitarian government which
values each group according to its size. There are many ways to extend our
framework and make the process of aggregating nativespreferences more
structured (and perhaps more realistic).
For example, one could think of a majoritarian democracy where only
the largest group of natives gets positive weight. If these are low skilled,
the government would aim at maximizing the skill ratio R. Alternatively,
one could introduce lobbying activities whereby each group may bid for
protection and try to increase its weight in the governments program. In
this case, the government may trade o¤ contributions and social welfare, and
aim at some intermediate R (see Bianchi, 2006, for some discussion along
these lines). More generally, one could add to our model one stage in which
the weights  are determined.
We have instead taken these weights as given and described how the
government would change immigration costs in order to move towards the
optimal skill ratio R. In this sense, much of the insights developed on size
vs. composition e¤ects are robust to the specic way in which the weights
 are determined.
4.3 Nativespreferences
We now discuss our assumptions about nativespreferences. First, it should
be noticed that the evidence on the labor market impact of immigration is
quite controversial. While some studies nd a rather small impact on na-
tiveswages (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995 and Card, 2005), others like Borjas
(2003) document that immigrants compete with similarly skilled natives and
signicantly lower their equilibrium wages. In a political economy frame-
work, it would su¢ ce that citizensbeliefs, rather than actual e¤ects, are
consistent with our assumptions on labor market interactions.24 Moreover,
as argued below, our focus on the e¤ects on R may be useful to analyze
several other issues.
Second, while considering a linear utility function simplies our analy-
sis, one may introduce a more general form for nativesutility. Each group
24Considering the centrality of labor market competition in policy debates, and the
evidence on attitudes towards immigration mentioned in footnote 6, this seems less con-
troversial.
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would then receive a weight which depends on  and on the groups mar-
ginal utility, and this would induce a greater concern for the low skilled (who
have higher marginal utility). In this case, it need not be that any immigra-
tion restriction is driven by the composition e¤ect (as stated in Proposition
1), since distributional concerns would provide an additional reason to re-
strict low skilled immigration. But again, to the extent that the government
program requires setting an optimal R; our analysis on size and composition
e¤ects would be valid.
Finally, nativespreferences over immigration policy may include several
dimensions we have abstracted from. However, focusing on the skill ratio
R may provide a useful framework to analyze many such dimensions. Con-
sider for example public nance and political economy issues. From a scal
viewpoint, one may argue that high skilled immigrants are always preferred
since they pay higher taxes and receive less welfare benets. Hence, high
skilled natives would trade-o¤ the reduction in wages with the scal ben-
et of accepting high skilled immigrants.25 On political economy issues, if
immigrants gain political power in the receiving country, then natives may
trade-o¤ the e¤ect on their wages with the one on the political equilibrium
(like in Ortega, 2005). However, if immigrants oppose restrictions to im-
migration irrespective of their skills,26 this political economy e¤ect has the
same direction of the labor market e¤ect considered above.
4.4 Returns to skills
Many of our predictions on the relation between immigration restrictions
and immigrantsskill composition depend on di¤erential returns to skills in
sending vs. destination countries. We now discuss the extent to which the
literature provides some general pattern for such di¤erentials.
Several reasons have been proposed to expect higher returns to skills
in developed countries, like higher total factor productivity (Lucas, 1990),
skill complementarities (Kremer, 1993), or skill biased technological change
(Acemoglu, 1998); but also to expect the opposite, like the high supply of
skills (Blau and Kahn, 1996) or the existence of labor market institutions
which compress wages (Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem, 2004). Empir-
ical studies tends to report that returns to skills decrease with per-capita
GDP (Bils and Klenow, 2000; Freeman and Oostendorp, 2000; Psacharopou-
25Suppose that the government collects tw and distributes the revenues with a lump
sum transfer to every worker. Now high skilled utility is a convex combination with
weight t of the wage wH ; which depends negatively on R; and the transfers, which depend
positively on R. The e¤ects of these concerns on individual preferences over immigration
is documented in Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007) and Facchini and Mayda (2006).
26Lowell, Bean and de la Garza (1986) and Goldin (1994) report that immigrants lobbied
and voted for pro-immigration policies, and a number of survey studies report that immi-
grant have more favorable attitudes towards immigration, irrespective of their economic
condition (see Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996 and Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).
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los and Patrinos, 2002; Caselli and Coleman, 2006), but di¤erences are not
huge, and general patterns appear weak.27
In the immigration literature, accordingly, there is no consensus. Various
models simply assume that a worker with skill s in country j gets a wage
kj  s; which by construction implies that returns to skills are higher in more
developed countries (Chiswick, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Jasso and Rosenzweig,
2008). On the other hand, several studies, following Borjas (1987), stress
that wage inequality may be higher in developing countries and so the low
skilled may have the greatest incentives to migrate.
Instead of looking for a general pattern, it appears that sensible insights
may be derived from specic microanalysis. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005),
for example, estimate that real wage premia for Mexican immigrants to the
U.S. decrease with education. Similar estimates can be found in the analysis
of Palestinian immigrants to Israel (Yashiv, 2004). These studies conrm
our general point that self-selection is in general driven both by incentives
and by constraints: those who can access migration are not necessarily those
who have more to gain from it.
An equally important issue in estimating returns to skills regards the
mapping from skills to jobs. Immigrants need not access the same spec-
trum of jobs and wages as natives, and in many instances they may be
locked into low skilled occupations (see Munshi, 2003). Such mapping is
di¢ cult to measure and to compare across countries, and indeed it has been
typically overlooked by this literature (see Borjas, 1994), but it may drive
self-selection and the impact of immigration in the receiving country.28 Sup-
pose that good jobs are harder to get for immigrants, perhaps due to their
inability to assimilate or to a discriminatory labor market. In this case, it
is easy to see in our framework that incentives would push towards negative
self-selection, and so towards a negative relation between immigration re-
strictions and immigrantsskill composition. Moreover, irrespective of their
skills, immigrants would be more likely to depress low skilled wages.29
27Banerjee and Duo (2005) argue that the common wisdom that returns to skills are
higher in developing country is an artifact of low quality data.
28Assume that, in the sending country, workers with skill  have probability p to get
a good job and 1   p to get a bad one, and similarly for the destination country. The
requirement that returns to skills are higher in the receiving country writes (pH pL)w >
(pH   pL)w: For example, given that in Mexico wage inequality is higher but social
mobility is lower than in the U.S. (Dahan and Gaviria, 2001), who should be more likely
to migrate?
29To see this, one could introduce a parameter  2 [0; 1]; which measures barriers to
entry into well-paid jobs. High skilled immigrants would expect to earn wL+w; and the
skill ratio R would write (nH + xH)=(nL+ xL+ (1  )xH). Also, one may replicate our
analysis by focusing on  as a policy variable, as this is a¤ected e.g. by anti-discrimination
laws, recognition of foreign education...
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a simple framework for analyzing the in-
teraction between immigrants self-selection and the determination of im-
migration policy. We wish to conclude by suggesting some possible policy
implications of our results.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the e¤ects of immigration largely de-
pend on immigrantscomposition. Indeed, a large part of the policy debate
discusses how receiving countries may improve their ability to screen. In
this respect, our results show that, given immigrantsself-selection, any pol-
icy a¤ects di¤erent migrants in a di¤erent way, and so it has some indirect
screening power. Given that size and composition e¤ects tend to have oppo-
site directions, this may signicantly complicate the optimal policy design.
On the other hand, such screening power may be viewed as an additional
dimension to exploit. In fact, since as mentioned in Section 4.1 the e¤ective-
ness of direct screening mechanisms appears limited, immigration policies
may consider inuencing self-selection ex-ante rather than imposing restric-
tions ex-post.
In this respect, however, the present model does not deliver absolute
policy prescriptions. Instead, we have seen how things may change dramat-
ically depending on the forces driving the decision to migrate. If those who
migrate are simply those who can a¤ord it, increasing the migration cost,
e.g. through a tax on entry, is likely to improve immigrantsskill compo-
sition.30 Instead, as economic incentives become the main argument of the
migration decision, the e¤ect of these policies depends on di¤erential returns
to skills, and thus it may be more di¢ cult to predict. Discrimination and
bureaucracies push towards negative self-selection and, in this case, a more
restrictive policy is likely to lead to an even less skilled immigration (see
Sections 4.1 and 4.4).
The most general conclusion of this exploration is that immigrants
self-selection matters, also for receiving countries, since the forces shaping
self-selection a¤ect the way di¤erent potential migrants respond to policy
changes. Nothing is terribly surprising in this statement. There is a huge and
fundamental literature studying the response of di¤erent agents to changes
in prices.31 For some reason, the literature on immigration policy has gen-
erally overlooked this issue, and, under this perspective, this paper may be
a step towards lling the gap.
30Of course, one concern is that restrictions tend to encourage illegal immigration, that
is more attractive for the low skilled. However, the issue is common to any intervention
directed to regulate legal migration, and it reveals once again that restricting entry cannot
be the only dimension of a sound immigration policy.
31These agents being borrowers dealing with interest rates, workers with wages or poli-
cyholders with insurance premia (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
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